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Abstract. Game theory has been one of the most successful quanti-
tative concepts to describe social interactions, their strategical aspects,
and outcomes. Among the payoff matrix quantifying the result of a so-
cial interaction, the interaction conditions have been varied, such as the
number of repeated interactions, the number of interaction partners, the
possibility to punish defective behavior etc. While an extension to spa-
tial interactions has been considered early on such as in the “game of
life”, recent studies have focussed on effects of the structure of social
interaction networks.
However, the possibility of individuals to move and, thereby, evade ar-
eas with a high level of defection, and to seek areas with a high level
of cooperation, has not been fully explored so far. This contribution
presents a model combining game theoretical interactions with success-
driven motion in space, and studies the consequences that this may have
for the degree of cooperation and the spatio-temporal dynamics in the
population. It is demonstrated that the combination of game theoreti-
cal interactions with motion gives rise to many self-organized behavioral
patterns on an aggregate level, which can explain a variety of empirically
observed social behaviors.
1 Introduction
Macroscopic outcomes in a social system resulting from interactions be-
tween individuals can be quite different from anyone’s intent. For instance,
empirical investigations [1] have shown that most colored people prefer
multi-racial neighborhoods, and many white people find a certain fraction
of other races in their neighborhood acceptable. So one could think that
integrated neighborhoods should be widely observed, but empirically this
is not true. One rather finds segregated neighborhoods, i.e. separate urban
quarters, which also applies to people with different social and economic
backgrounds.
This problem is scientifically addressed by mainly two streams of seg-
regation theory [2]: the urban ecological “social distance” tradition in
sociology [3,4] and the “individual preferences” tradition in economics
[5,6]. The main idea of “social distance” theory is that the differences in
culture and interests between social groups are reflected by a separation
of their residential areas.
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Yet, the role of social distance and individual preferences is questioned
by studies of the American urban housing market, which suggest that
racial discrimination and prejudices are the primary factors of residential
segregation and concentration of poverty [7]. There are three stages in
a housing market transaction: first, information about available housing
units, second, terms and conditions of sales and financing assistance, and
third, the access to units other than the advertised unit [8]. In each stage,
the housing agent may behave in a discriminatory way, e.g. withhold in-
formation from customers and discourage them. Therefore, the access of
minority customers to housing is severely constrained, while the theory
of preference-based dynamics assumes that people can relocate freely ac-
cording to their own preferences, which fails to reflect the real relocation
dynamics.
Recent studies [2,9] point out that the effect of discrimination in
racial residential segregation was important in the past, but nowadays,
the nature and magnitude of housing discrimination has changed. Mi-
nority households who seek to move into integrated or predominantly
white areas usually will be able to do so. But the integration of ethnic
groups is not widely observed and quite unstable. This is partly because,
when people move to a neighborhood, where they constitute an ethnic mi-
nority, the previous inhabitants may choose to leave, while some people
may be reluctant to enter integrated neighborhoods in which minorities
are increasing in number, e.g. because of a decrease in the housing prices.
Such migration dynamics, based on seeking preferred neighborhoods, does
not necessarily presuppose the discrimination of other people, as we will
shortly see.
Assuming that individuals have just a slight preference for neighbor-
hoods, in which the same ethnic background prevails, Schelling has re-
produced residential segregation by a simple model [5,6]. Imagine that
two groups of people are distributed over a one-dimensional lattice, and
assume that everyone defines his/her relevant neighborhood by the four
nearest neighbors on either side of him/her. Moreover, assume that each
individual prefers at least four of his/her eight nearest neighbors to be-
long to same ethnic group as he/she does. Considering himself/herself,
this implies a small majority of five out nine people in the considered
neighborhood. If the condition is not met, he or she is assumed to move
to the nearest site/cell that satisfies his or her desire. Hence, the model
does not assume optimizing location choice, just satisficing behavior. Nev-
ertheless, it produces segregation patterns.
1.1 Migration, Game Theory, and Cooperation
In game theoretical terms, this movement to a more favorable neighbor-
hood could be reflected by a higher payoff to persons who moved, called
“migrants” in the following. Migratory behavior aiming at higher pay-
offs is called “success-driven motion” [10,11,12]. As we will show in later
sections, success-driven motion can reproduce residential segregation and
some other observed phenomena of population dynamics as well, like pop-
ulation succession (i.e. cycles of changing habitation) [13]. We will also
study how a change of the spatial population structure can affect the level
and evolution of cooperation in a population.
It could be thought that natural selection, implying competition be-
tween individuals, would result in selfish rather than cooperative behav-
ior [14]. Nevertheless, cooperation is widely observed also in competitive
settings, from bacteria, over animals to humans [15,16]. Game theory
[17,18,19,20] has been regarded as a powerful framework to investigate
this problem, as it can be used to quantify the interactions between indi-
viduals.
The mathematical description of tendencially selfish behavior is often
based on the prisoner’s dilemma game, in which the “reward” R repre-
sents the payoff for mutual cooperation, while the payoff for defection
(cheating) on both sides is reflected by the “punishment” P . Unilateral
cooperation will incur the so-called “sucker’s payoff” S, while the defector
gains T, the “temptation”. Given the inequalities T > R > P > S and
2R > T +S, defection is tempting and cooperation is risky, so that defec-
tion is expected to be dominating, although mutual cooperation improves
the average payoff.
In a well-mixed population, where an individual interacts with all
the others, a defector’s payoff is always higher than the average payoff,
which leads to a prosperity of defectors. In an evolutionary setting as
it is described by the replicator dynamics [21], only those strategies that
generate above-average payoffs have the chance to spread. Therefore, from
an evolutionary perspective, there will be no cooperators in the end, which
contradicts the observed cooperation in reality.
A variety of mechanisms has been proposed to explain the considerable
level of cooperation observed under certain circumstances. These include
kin selection, direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, group selection and
network reciprocity [14]. In particular, it is interesting that the spatial
population structure can significantly change the level of cooperation in a
population [22,23]. While there could be a co-evolution of social structure
and cooperation due to migratory behavior, this subject has not been well
studied in the past.
1.2 Migration and Population Succession
Population succession plays an important role in the change of the popula-
tion structure in urban areas. The term succession is viewed by ecologists
as an orderly sequence of changes in the composition or structure of a
biotic community [24]. Later on, it was also used to describe the change
in neighborhood and urban land use [25]. For example, Cressey [13] an-
alyzed the movements of immigrants in Chicago from 1898 to 1930 by
census tracts and provided a detailed picture of the succession processes
of specific cultural groups. Interestingly, these processes show a cycle of
invasion, conflict, recession, and reorganization [26].
The “invasion” can be initiated by a few “pioneers”, who manage
to enter a new area dominated by “older” residents. For example, some
rich colored people may move to a white-only neighborhood, where the
housing price is relatively high. In this stage, discrimination by a housing
agency could prevent the integration of cultural groups by constraining
information to minority groups [8]. But nowadays, housing discrimina-
tion is illegal in many countries, and the hostility toward minority group
members has declined. Therefore, the possibility of successful entrance
for those “pioneers” is much larger.
Following the initial “invaders”, invasions can happen on a much
larger scale, in particular if housing prices go down. Then, previous res-
idents, who want to sell their houses at a good price, are eventually re-
placed. People may even move without reasons, just following the trend
of what the others do, which is a kind of collective herding behavior [27].
Accompanying this replacement process, the changing composition of the
population may cause conflicts due to incompatible cultural values and
prejudices [28].
Eventually, the population composition is turned over. Although the
new group can dominate the residential area, it takes time to reorga-
nize the environment such as churches and to create it according to their
own requirements. The cycle can repeat as the previous “invaders” be-
come established residents. Therefore, there is a typical life circle of a
neighborhood [25], which involves five stages: development, transition,
downgrading, thinning out, and renewal. If the facilities in a neighbor-
hood are running down, residents start to seek new places and abandon
the previous one. In this case, there is usually little conflict. In the sub-
sequent renewal stage, new people move in at low prices. By renovating
the houses, the quarter eventually revives.
1.3 Co-evoultion of Social Structure and Cooperation
In order to model such intentional movement of individuals, spatial ef-
fects must be explicitly considered. Spatial games based on lattices [22]
would allow one to study such effects. In conventional spatial games, in-
dividuals are uniformly distributed in the simulation area, and change or
repeat their strategies, following a certain updating rule. For instance,
an individual is assumed to unconditionally adopt the most successful
strategy within the neighborhood. On the one hand, this creates typi-
cal spatio-temporal pattern. On the other hand, spatial structures play
an important role in the maintenance of cooperation. In the iterative
prisoner’s dilemma, for example, clusters of cooperators are beneficial
to cooperators [12], while the evolving spatial structure in the snowdrift
game [23], may inhibit cooperation. Conventional spatial games, however,
neglect the possibility of individuals to move or migrate, although mo-
bility is a well-known fact of daily social interactions. We will see that
the movement of individuals, e.g. population succession, can change the
spatial structure of a population significantly, and influence the evolution
of cooperation dramatically.
The above mentioned social processes that are related to the migratory
behavior of people, can be well integrated into the framework of spatial
games. Focusing on success-driven motion, we will in the following, study
the combination of migration, strategic interactions and learning (specif-
ically imitation). Numerical simulations show that success-driven motion
is a mechanism that can promote cooperation via self-organized social
structures. Moreover, very surprisingly, a certain degree of fluctuations
(“noise”) can even enhance the level of cooperation.
2 Spatial Games with Mobility
2.1 Classification
Spatial games with mobility (“mobility games”) could be classified as
follows:
1. Mobility may take place in physical (geographic) space with one, two
or three dimensions, or it may occur in abstract space (e.g. opinion
space). Rather than a regular (grid) space, one may also have a (fixed
or dynamically changing) network structure (e.g. friendship network).
2. One may distinguish between games with continuous and with dis-
crete motion. The first ones may be considered as particular cases of
differential games [29] and shall be called “motion games”. The sec-
ond ones will be named “migration games” and can be implemented,
for example, in terms of cellular automata (particularly, if a parallel
update is performed).
3. The mobility game may be deterministic or “noisy”, i.e. influenced
by fluctuations. Such “noise” may be introduced by stochastic update
rules (e.g. a random sequential update or the Fermi rule [23].
4. Multiple occupation of a certain location may be possible, allowing for
the agglomeration of individuals, or it may be prohibited. In the latter
case, spatial exclusion requires spatial capacity constraints and/or the
respect or protection of some “private territory”.
5. In mobility games with spatial exclusion, empty sites are needed.
Therefore, the density of free locations (“sites”) is a relevant model
parameter.
6. The frequency, rate, or speed of mobility may be relevant as well and
should be compared with other time scales, such as the frequency of
strategy changes, or the average lifetime of a spatial cluster of indi-
viduals. Depending on the specification of the game, after a transient
time one may find everything from chaotic patterns [22] upto frozen
patterns [30,31]. This may be expressed by a viscosity parameter [32].
7. Mobility may be random or directed (e.g. “success-driven”). Directed
mobility may depend on the expected payoff in a certain time point
(iteration), or it may depend on the cumulative payoff (i.e. the accu-
mulation of wealth by individuals).
8. If age, birth and death are considered, one speaks of “demographic
games” [33].
In the following, we will primarily focus on games with success-driven
migration in two-dimensional geographic space. Furthermore, we will as-
sume simple strategies (such as all-cooperate or all-defect), no memory
and no forecasting abilities.
2.2 Individual Decision Making and Migration
In “migration games”, each individual I is located at the positionXI of a
discrete grid and applies a certain strategy i = i(I,X, t) when interacting
with individuals J at locationsXJ in the neighborhoodN = N (XI), who
apply strategies j = j(J,X′, t) (see Fig. 1). The interactions at time t are
quantified by the payoffs Pij . The overall payoff for individual I resulting
from interactions with all individuals J in the neighborhood N (XI) at
time t is
PI(t) = PI(XI , t) =
∑
J :XJ∈N (XI)
Pij(J). (1)
Fig. 1. The focal individual I is represented by the empty circle. It can,
for example, interact with the k = 4 nearest individuals (red) or with
k = 8 neighbors, which includes four next-nearest neighbors (black).
We assume that all individuals prefer places that can provide higher
payoff. However, their movements are restricted by their mobilities and
the number of free locations, as one can only move to empty places. In our
model, the mobility is reflected by the migration range M , which could
be assumed constant (see Fig. 2) or as a function of cumulative payoffs
CI(t) =
t∑
t′=0
[PI(t′)− cI(t′)]. (2)
Here, the cost of each movement cI(t) may be specified proportionally
to the distance dI(t) ≤M moved:
cI(t) = β dI(t). (3)
β is a constant.
When the migration range M is restricted by the cumulative payoff,
one may set
M(t) = bα CI(t)c, (4)
where b c rounds down to the next integer ≤ αCI(t) and α is a constant,
which is set to 1β in the following.
Fig. 2. (A) When M = 1, the focal individual (black circle) can migrate
within the red square (Moore neighborhood of range 1). (B) Here, the
migration neighborhood is chosen as Moore neighborhood of range M =
2.
The expected payoff for individual I applying strategy i at a free
location X′ within the migration range can be calculated as
PI(X′, t) =
∑
J ′:XJ′∈N (X′)
Pij′(J ′), (5)
where j′ = j′(J ′,X′, t) are the strategies of the individuals J ′ located
within the neighborhood N ′ = N (X′) centered at X′. Here, we assume
that an individual can determine this value by testing a neighborhood N ′
by means of some kind of “fictitious play” with its residents.
All individuals are assumed to maximize the expected payoff by mi-
grating to the place that promises the highest payoff. Consequently, the
payoff at the new destination for I is expected to be
P eI (t+ 1) = max
X′∈A
PI(X′, t), (6)
where A represents the area within the migration range M around XI .
In our model, individuals decide to move, if the expected payoff at the
new position P eI (t+ 1) satisfies the short-term cost-benefit condition
P eI (t+ 1)− PI(t) > cI(t). (7)
If we assume that the cost of each movement is small, and the new
neighborhood yields a comparatively high cumulative payoff over the time
period the individual stays at that place, then the cost of movement can
be neglected.
Finally, if two or more places promise the same maximum payoff, we
assume that an individual will choose the closest one. If both, the payoff
and distance are the same, then the individual will randomly choose one
of the closest locations in our simulation. Since all the other individuals
also seek new places that can increase their payoffs, neighborhoods may
change quickly, and the resulting payoff may fall below the expectations
before the move (during the fictitious play step).
2.3 Learning
Learning allows individuals to adapt their behaviors in response to other
people’s behaviors in an interactive decision making setting. Basic learn-
ing mechanisms are, for example, unconditional imitation, best reply, and
reinforcement learning [34].
Unconditional imitation means that people copy the behaviors of oth-
ers. For instance, we can assume that, when i reaches a new place, it im-
itates the most successful strategy within the neighborhood (if it is more
successful than the own strategy), or the most frequently used strategy in
past interactions. It should be underlined, that it is not easy to identify
the future strategy of another individual from its displayed past behavior.
However, in the simplified context of a prisoner’s dilemma, where individ-
uals are assumed to play either all-defect or all-cooperate, one’s behavior
reveals the strategy directly. It may nevertheless change before the next
iteration due to learning of the neighbors.
Reinforcement learning is a kind of backward-looking learning behav-
ior, i.e. people tend to take the actions that yielded high payoffs in the
past. Assuming that an individual has a set of strategies, among which
he or she chooses with a certain probability, this probability is increased,
if the gained payoff exceeds a certain threshold value (“aspiration level”)
[35,36].
Best reply is a sophisticated learning model as well. According to
it, people choose their strategies based on the expectation of what the
others will do in a way that maximizes their expected payoff. The ability
to forecast depends on one’s belief about the behaviors of the others.
For instance, one can try to determine the distribution of the neighbors’
previous actions, and select the own strategy, which replies to it in the
best way.
For simplicity, players in our model only interact with the k = 4
nearest neighbors and adapt their strategies by unconditional imitation.
Assuming that the updating rules of all the individuals are the same, we
can specify a simple migration game as follows:
1. An individual moves to a new position that is located inside the mi-
gration range M and maximizes the expected payoff.
2. The individual imitates the most successful strategy within the inter-
action neighborhood N , if it is more successful than the own strategy.
Note that changing the sequence leads to a different dynamics, and
the implementation of migration and learning can be varied in many
ways. Therefore, spatial games with mobility promise to be a rich research
field. In the following, we will restrict ourselves to some of the simplest
specifications.
The above mentioned framework of spatial games with migration spec-
ifies a kind of cellular automata (CA) model, in which space and time are
discrete. Furthermore, the set of actions performed in CA models usually
depends on the last time step only, which allows for high-performance
computing of large-scale scenarios. CA models have been successfully ap-
plied to describe a variety of social and physical systems [33,37,38]. The
outcomes of social and physical interactions can be very well integrated
into them, which can create many interesting dynamics, like the “game
of life” [39].
3 Simulation Results and Discussion
In the following, we perform a random sequential update of the individ-
ual (i.e. their migration and learning steps), which is to be distinguished
from the parallel update assumed in [22,30]. For a discussion of some
related advantages, see [40]. Our numerical simulations are performed
on 49×49 grids with 40% empty sites, i.e. a density of 0.6 and periodic
boundary conditions.49x49 grids were chosen for better visibility, while
the statistical evaluations (see Figs. 6 and 7) were done with 99×99 grids
for comparability with Nowak’s and May’s spatial games [22]. In the pris-
oner’s dilemma, the color code is chosen as follows: blue = cooperator,
red = defector, green = defector who became a cooperator, yellow = co-
operator who turned into a defector in the last iteration. In other games,
blue = player of group 1, red = player of group 2, green = player of group
2 who became a player of group 1, yellow = player of group 1 who turned
into a player of group 2. White always corresponds to an empty site.
3.1 Spontaneous Pattern Formation and Population Structure
In the migration game, individual preferences are reflected by the pay-
off matrix, which quantifies the possible outcomes of social interactions.
Fig. 3 shows a variety of patterns formed when the payoff matrix is mod-
ified. The outcomes from interactions between individuals are the driving
forces changing the population structure in space. In the following, we will
call all the individuals, who apply the same strategy, a “group” g. Group
1 is represented in blue, group 2 in red. The size Ng of group g is constant
in true only in the migration-only case without learning. Otherwise, strat-
egy changes imply changes of individuals between groups and changes in
group size. We will distinguish the three social relations between groups:
(i) both groups (or, more exactly speaking, their individuals) like each
other (P12 = P21 = 1), (ii) group 1 is neutral with respect to group 2, but
group 2 dislikes group 1 (P12 = 0, P21 = −1), and (iii) intra-group inter-
actions are more favored than inter-group interactions (P11 = P22 = 1,
P12 = P21 = 0.5). Intra-group affiliation is always preferred or at least
neutral (P11 = P22 = 1 or P11 = P22 = 0). As people are allowed to
move, when they like each other, a strong integration of populations can
be observed. However, if the affinity is unilateral, then one population
tends to evade the invasion of the other. Assuming the same mobility in
both populations, in the current setting of our simulations the chasing
population gains the majority in the end, if unconditional imitation is
considered.
Residential segregation emerges through the interactions of individu-
als, not only when they dislike each other, but also if individuals within
the same group like each other more than individual from other groups.
When inter-group interactions result in smaller payoffs, people attempt
to maximize their payoff by agglomerating with the same kind of people,
which eventually results in the segregation of different groups as a side
effect.
Some theoretical analysis can be useful to understand the micro-macro
link. Let ng1 and ng2 be the average number of individuals of group 1 and
2, respectively, in the interaction neighborhood of an individual using
strategy i, i.e. belonging to group g = i. Then, the payoff of an individual
belonging to group g ∈ {1, 2} is
Pg = ng1Pg1 + ng2Pg2, (8)
where Pgi is the payoff of an individual of group g when meeting an
individual using strategy i.
Fig. 3. Simulation results for 49×49 grids with a density of 0.6 for the
migration-only case (left), the imitation-only case of conventional spatial
games (middle) and the combination of imitation with migration (right).
The color code is chosen as folows: blue = player of group 1, red = player
of group 2, yellow = player of group 1 who turned into a player of group
2 in the last iteration, green = player of group 2 who turned into a player
of group 1 in the last iteration, white = empty site. (A) P11 = P22 =
0, P12 = P21 = 1. Inter-group interaction is encouraged, which causes
the integration of two populations. The combination of migration and
imitation results in the co-existence of both groups and the formation of
clusters. (B) P11 = P22 = P12 = 1, P21 = −1. When affinity is unilateral,
one population keeps approaching the other one, which tends to evade.
The combination of migration and imitation leads to the spreading of
the chasing group. Co-existence is not observed. (C) P11 = P22 = 1,
P21 = P21 = 0.5. When interactions between groups are less profitable
than in the same group, residential segregation occurs as well, but in
contrast to (B), it stabilizes.
The total payoffs for individuals of group g is NgPg, while the total
payoff of both groups is
T ′ = N1P1 +N2P2, (9)
where Ng is the number of individuals of group g, i.e. pursuing strategy
g = i.
According to success-driven migration, the change of an individual’s
payoff in the noiseless case is always positive, i.e.
∆Pg = ∆ng1Pg1 +∆ng2Pg2 > 0 (10)
with ∆ng1 = ng1(t+ 1)− ng1(t) and ∆ng2 = ng2(t+ 1)− ng2(t).
Assuming P12  P11 and P12 > 0, we will usually have ∆P1 ≈
∆n12P12 > 0 and ∆n12 > 0, which leads to a monotonous increase in
the number of neighbors of individuals of group 1. Giving the inequality
P11  P12 and P11 > 0, we analogously obtain ∆P1 ≈ ∆n11P11 > 0 and
∆n11 > 0. Therefore, when intra-group interactions of group 1 are much
stronger than inter-group interactions, and positive, clusters of group 1
will expand, as each migration step will increase the average number of
neighbors within group 1. However, when P11 < 0, the formation of clus-
ters of individuals belonging to group 1 by intra-group interactions is
unlikely. When P12 < 0, an individual of group 1 tends to evade members
of group 2, which can be regarded as a repulsive effect attempting to keep
a certain distance between individuals of different groups [41].
The total change of payoff is given by
∆T ′ = N1(∆n11P11 +∆n12P12) +N2(∆n21P21 +∆n22P22) > 0, (11)
as long as success-driven migration is applied by all the individuals, and
changes ∆N1 and ∆N2 in the group sizes are negligible.
Let us now consider a simple example, where P11 = P22 = 0. Then,
we have
∆T ′ = N1∆n12P12 +N2∆n21P21, (12)
which reflects the combined effects of interactions between members of
group 1 and 2. Furthermore, if ∆T ′ > 0, we expect that the number
of neighborships between individuals of both groups will monotonously
increase. The corresponding macroscopic phenomenon is the spatial inte-
gration (mixture) of both groups. However, if (P12 +P21) < 0, the reduc-
tion of inter-group links is likely and will result in residential segregation
(see Fig. 3).
Here we have examined how individual preferences can change the
spatial population structure in a very simple social system considering mi-
gratory behavior. The revealed social process can, to some extent, reflect
the dynamics of population succession in urban areas. This corresponds
to case B in Fig. 3. Consider the payoff matrix in Fig. 3B, and imagine
that an individual of group 1 happens to be located in the neighborhood
of group 2. For the previous residents, this may not change a lot. How-
ever, it attracts other members of group 1, who are not yet living in a
neighborhood of group 1 individuals. This can trigger collective migration
of other group 1 members. Since interactions between members of group
1 and 2 bring positive payoffs only for members of group 1, group 2 will
finally leave for new places. Of course, this process repeats, just like the
circle of population succession in Sec. 1.2.
One may notice that, here, we do not differentiate the intention to
migrate and the actual migratory behavior. In daily life, however, the
movement of people is restricted by much more factors such as wealth
and time, so people do not migrate often, even if they are motivated
to move. But in our simulations as well, migration activity after a few
iterations is small: Starting with high migration rate, due to the artificial
choice of a random initial distribution, the migration rate quickly drops
to a low level [12]. Of course, other factors determining migration can be
easily added to the above proposed framework of migration games.
3.2 Promotion of Cooperation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma
The prisoner’s dilemma is an important paradigm for studying the emer-
gence of cooperation among selfish individuals. Nevertheless, studies of
the prisoner’s dilemma on lattices have not fully explored the effect of
mobility. It would be logical, of course, for people to evade areas with a
high level of defection, and to settle down in areas dominated by cooper-
ators. But would cooperative areas be able to survive invasion attempts
by defectors or even to spread in space? To answer these questions, we
will now focus on the effects of success-driven migration on the spatial
population structure and the level of cooperation.
Fig. 4 compares the migration-only case with M = 5 (left) with the
imitation only case corresponding to M = 0 (center) and the combined
imitation-and-migration case with M = 5 (right). In the imitation-only
case, the proportion of cooperators is greatly reduced. However, the com-
bination of migration and imitation strikingly promotes the level of coop-
eration. Our explanation is that, when individuals have mobility, cooper-
ative clusters are more likely to be promoted in the presence of invasion
attempts of defectors. We can see that, in the migration-only case, co-
operators manage to aggregate and to form clusters. Although defectors
attempt to enter cooperative clusters, they finally end up at the bound-
aries of cooperative clusters, as cooperators split to evade defectors and
re-aggregate in new places, where defectors are excluded. In the pris-
oner’s dilemma, it is guaranteed that 2R > T + S, which means that
the “attractive force” between cooperators is mutual and strong, while
the interaction between a cooperator and a defector leads to a unilateral
attractive force (T > 0). When S < 0, a cooperator replies to defectors
even in a repulsive way. Therefore, defectors are less successful in joining
or entering cooperative clusters than cooperators are.
Configurational analysis [12] (see Fig. 5), indicates that, when P =
S = 0, and an individual only interacts with k = 4 nearest neighbors, a
cooperative cluster can turn a defector into cooperator by unconditional
imitation for T < 1.5R, when the defector is surrounded with one or
two cooperators. When a defector is surrounded with three cooperators,
cooperators can resist the invasion of a defector, even if the temptation
value T is as high as 43R. A defector can invade one of the nearby cooper-
ators, if its neighborhood is fully occupied by cooperators. Therefore, the
formation of compact clusters is important to support the spreading of
cooperation. If k > 4, the spreading of cooperation occurs even for higher
value of T .
In spatial games without mobility, the occurrence of a compact coop-
erative clusters mainly depends on the initial distribution. Giving mobil-
ities, the migratory behavior can significantly accelerate the formation of
compact clusters, and promote the level of cooperation.
Quantitative studies of how migration can promote the level of co-
operation have to compare the fraction of cooperators in situations with
mobility and without. Fig. 6 shows the amplification factor, defined as
δ(T,M) =
fTM
fT0
. (13)
fTM is the fraction of cooperators, given the mobility range M and a temp-
tation value of T . We can see that the level of cooperation in the prisoner’s
dilemma is promoted in a large parameter area, if the punishment P and
the sucker’s payoff are roughly comparable in size.
However, we have not yet studied the robustness of the migration
mechanism so far. One may imagine that, once a defector would manage
to invade a cooperative cluster, it may turn neighboring cooperators into
defectors as well, thereby eliminating cooperation eventually. While in
Fig. 4. Simulation results for 49×49 grids with a density of 0.6 for the
migration-only case (left), the imitation-only case of conventional spatial
games (middle) and the combination of imitation with migration (right).
The color code is chosen as follows: blue = player of group 1, red =
player of group 2, yellow = player of group 1 who turned into a player
of group 2 in the last iteration, green = player of group 2 who turned
into a player of group 1 in the last iteration, white = empty site. (A)
P11 = R = 1, P12 = S = −0.2, P21 = T = 1.4, P22 = P = 0. The
payoff matrix corresponds to a prisoner’s dilemma. (B) P11 = R = 1,
P12 = S = 0, P21 = T = 1.4, P22 = P = 0. The sucker’s payoff is set
to zero to be compatible with the payoff matrix studied by Nowak and
May. (C) P11 = R = 1, P12 = S = −0.2, P21 = T = 1.4, P22 = P = 0.
The migration and imitation step are inverted here, i.e. an individual first
imitates, then migrates. (D) P11 = 0.59, P12 = 0.18, P21 = 1, P22 = 0. In
the snow-drift game, similar structures are found in the migration-only
and imitation-only case. Giving the possibility to move, frequent switches
of strategies are observed. See main text for details.
Fig. 5. Analysis of the invasion of a cluster of cooperators (black circles)
by a single defector (cross). For the simplicity of analysis, we assume S =
P = 0 here, but one can easily generalize the analysis to the situations
with P > S > 0. (A) Scenario 1: The payoff for the defector is T , while its
neighboring cooperator obtains a payoff of 3R. Since 3R > T , the defector
will become a cooperator. (B) Scenario 2: The payoff for the defector is
2T , while the maximal payoff among neighboring cooperators is 3R. In
order to make the defector become a cooperator, we need 3R > 2T , i.e.
T < 1.5R. (C) Scenario 3: The defector obtains 3T , while the maximal
payoff of neighboring cooperators is 3R. In order to turn the defector
into a cooperator, the inequality 3R > 3T must be satisfied, i.e. T < R.
This condition can never be met in the prisoner’s dilemma. In order that
cooperators do not copy the defector, 4R > 3T must be satisfied, i.e.
T < 43R. (D) Scenario 4: The payoff for the defector is 4T , the maximal
payoff of cooperators in the whole community is 4R. Because of T >
R, the defector can invade the cooperators nearby. Once a cooperator
becomes a defector however, the payoff for the defectors will be reduced
from 4T to 3T , which may stop the further invasion of defectors
Fig. 6. Amplification factor of the level of cooperation by migration (M =
5) as a function of the sucker’s payoff P12 = S and the punishment P22 =
P in the prisoner’s dilemma (S < P ) and the snow drift game (S > P ).
The simulation was performed for 99×99 grids with a density of 0.6. P
and S were varied between −1 and 1, the payoffs R = 1 and T = 1.3 were
left fix.
a noiseless environment, a defector cannot enter the center of a compact
cooperative cluster, “noise” could make it happen with a certain probabil-
ity. As defectors in a cooperative cluster can spread (see Fig. 5 D), noise
could therefore be thought to destroy the enhancement of cooperation by
success-driven migration. Very surprisingly, this is not the case!
In order to verify that success-driven migration robustly promotes
cooperation, we have implemented 3 kinds of noises. In each time step, a
certain proportion y of individuals was selected to perform the following
operations after the respective migration and imitation steps:
Noise 1: The selected players’ locations were exchanged with a randomly
chosen neighboring site (“neighborhood flipping”).
Noise 2: The selected players’ strategies were flipped, i.e. cooperation was
replaced by defection and vice versa (“strategy flipping”).
Noise 3: The selected players were removed from the grid, and an equal
number of players was created at randomly chosen free sites, in order
to mimic birth and death processes. The newly born players had a 50%
chance to be cooperators and a 50% chance to be defectors.
Fig. 7 shows the time evolution of the number of cooperators with
noise strength y = 2% and y = 10% respectively. Without mobility,
noise reduces the number of cooperators greatly. For a mobility range
M = 5, however, we surprisingly find that the level of cooperation can be
still maintained at a high level. With 2% noise, noises 1 and 3 can even
increase the number of cooperators compared to the no-noise case!
In order to understand how noise can promote cooperation to a level
higher than the level in a noiseless system, we may define a kind of po-
tential energy function of the system by the negative total payoff:
E = −T ′. (14)
In a noiseless system, each individual’s migration step will increase T ,
and reduce the potential energy of the system, [see Eq. (11)]. Then an in-
dividual will adopt the most successful strategy within its neighborhood.
The imitation step and noise can flip the strategies and increase the en-
ergy of the system. Just as for the energy functions in spin glass models
[42], recurrent neural networks [43] and Boltzman machines [44], there are
many local minima of E in the migration game, one of which is reached
within a few iteration steps. Then the noiseless system behaves station-
ary. It is stuck in the corresponding meta-stable state, which is highly
dependent on the initial condition. When noise occurs, it can perturb the
meta-stable state of the system and drive it to more stable states (see
Fig. 8). Only if the noise level is too strong, the system behaves pretty
Fig. 7. Time evolution of the number of cooperators. Here, the simulation
is performed on 99×99 grids with a density of 0.6 and payoffs P11 = R = 1,
P12 = S = 0, P21 = T = 1.3, and P22 = P = 0.
much in a random way. Therefore, in conclusion, moderate levels of noise
do not destroy a high level of cooperation—they can even support it.
Fig. 8. Noise can make the system leave a sub-optimal state and reach
the globally optimal state.
Our results for the conventional prisoner’s dilemma with P > S con-
firm the robustness of migration as a mechanism to promote cooperation
(see Fig. 9). One can easily see that, without mobility, the proportion of
cooperators is close to zero, while there is still a certain small number of
cooperators in the environment without noise. However, when individuals
can move, cooperation is significantly increased due to the spontaneous
formation of clusters. Imagine that a defector is located in the center of a
cooperators’ cluster. In the beginning, defection can invade cooperation
due to the higher payoff (see Fig. 5 D). But once a neighboring cooperator
becomes a defector, a defector’s payoff is reduced from 4T to 3T , if P = 0.
If more cooperators turn into defectors, the payoff will be further reduced.
Therefore, the exploitation of cooperators by defectors is self-inhibitory,
if individuals copy better performing neighbors. Furthermore, a splitting
of a cooperative cluster can occur, since cooperators try to move to more
favorable neighborhood as soon as defectors are approaching them. The
migration of those cooperators can encourage other cooperators, whose
payoff depends on the mutual interactions, to move as well. That is, de-
fectors may trigger a collective movement of cooperators. Of course, the
newly formed cooperative clusters are also likely to be invaded by neigh-
borhood or strategy flipping, or birth and death process. However, this
will just repeat the above mentioned migration process. Therefore, coop-
erators can survive and spread even in a noisy world. Such a dynamical
change of the population structure through invasion and succession re-
flects various features of the migratory behavior observed in reality (see
sec. 1.2).
In the migration rule studied above, we assume that a favorable neigh-
borhood can be determined by fictitious play, i.e. some low-cost interac-
tions with the people in that neighborhood (“neighborhood testing”). One
may think that this is difficult in reality as it requires to reveal people’s
strategies. However, one may also argue that people tend to migrate to
high-quality residential areas, which provide better education for children,
a low crime rate, and other social welfare. In fact, neighborhoods are of-
ten “labeled”, and it may be assumed that this label (the appearance and
character of a neighborhood) depends on the total cumulative payoffs (the
accumulated wealth) of the residents in the neighborhood. Therefore, one
could assume that individuals try to move to the neighborhood with the
highest cumulative payoff. The success-driven migration based on such a
wealth-based “neighborhood tagging” is examined in Fig. 10. Again, we
find that migration promotes the formation of cooperative clusters and
an enhanced level of cooperation.
Fig. 9. Effect of different kinds of noises on the outcome of the spatial
prisoner’s dilemma with migration but no imitation (left), with imitation,
but no migration (center), and with both, migration and imitation (right).
The simulation is performed on 49×49 grids with a density of 0.6. The
color code is chosen as follows: red = defector, blue = cooperator, green =
defector who became a cooperator, yellow = cooperator who turned into
a defector in the last iteration, white = empty site. While the resulting
level of cooperation is very small in the conventional imitation-only case
(center), the additional consideration of migration results in large levels of
cooperation even in the presence of different kinds of noise. (A) No noise.
(B) Noise 1 (neighborhood flipping). (C) Noise 2 (strategy flipping). (D)
Noise 3 (birth and death). The payoffs were T = 1.3, R = 1, P = 0.1,
and S = 0 in all cases. See main text for details.
Fig. 10. Migratory prisoner’s dilemma with wealth-based neighborhood-
tagging rather than neighborhood testing as before. The simulation is
performed on 49×49 grids with a density of 0.6. The color code is chosen as
follows: red = defector, blue = cooperator, green = defector who became
a cooperator, yellow = cooperator who turned into a defector in the last
iteration, white = empty site. (A) P11 = R = 1, P12 = S = 0, P21 =
T = 1.4, P22 = P = 0. (B) P11 = R = 1, P12 = S = 0, P21 = T = 1.4,
P22 = P = 0, as in (A), but the update rule is inverted, i.e. an individual,
first imitates, then migrates. In both cases, one can see that, without
mobility, the proportion of cooperators becomes very low. However, when
success-driven migration is possible, cooperation can spread, even if the
sequence of the migration step and the unconditional imitation step is
inverted.
4 Conclusions
We have introduced the concept of migration games by considering success-
driven motion. Migration games can easily reproduce macroscopic stylized
facts of various social phenomena based on individual actions and inter-
actions. Typical examples are population succession and residential segre-
gation. These aggregate outcomes emerge from the interactions between
individuals in a non-trivial way, and a theoretical analysis allows one to
qualitatively understand the relation between the microscopic interactions
and the emerging macroscopic phenomena. Nevertheless, further studies
are required to fully elaborate the micro-macro link in a quantitative way.
For the prisoner’s dilemma, we have shown that self-organized co-
operative structures can promote the level of cooperation. Moreover, we
have verified that the enhancement of cooperation by success-driven mo-
tion is robust to different kinds of noise. Surprisingly, we even find that
moderate noise levels can promote the cooperation level further. The un-
derlying mechanism is that, in the migration game, success-driven motion
will monotonously increase the total payoff in the noiseless system, which
however can lead the system into a locally optimal state. The effect of
noise can drive the system out of local optima towards the globally opti-
mal state.
The framework of migration games is quite flexible and allows the
integration of other interactions to study further social processes.
The spatial structure in our simulation is very simple, and the neigh-
borhood depends only on an individual’s position. Real cities are more
complex and show a co-evolutionary dynamics. For example, the city
structure can reflect the distribution of social status groups. Early mod-
els like the Burgess concentric zone model [45] divides the city into specific
areas separated by status rings. The city center is located in the middle
of the circle, around which newer, higher-quality housing stocks tend to
emerge at the perimeter of the city. Therefore, the growth of the city
center will expand adjacent residential zones outwards.
Status segregation is quite obvious in such an idealized model of city
structure. Poor people or new immigrants may only afford low quality
housing. Middle class people live in less compacted neighborhoods. Rich
people tend to accumulate in particular quarters.
Burgess’s model is based on the bid rent curve. Recognizing that some
poor people prefer to live near the main transportation arteries and com-
mercial establishments, Hoyt [46] modified the concentric zone model to
take this into account. In Hoyt’s model, cities tend to grow in wedge-
shaped patterns or sectors. Major transportation routes are emanating
from the central business district (CBD). The residential areas for lower
income people are located adjacent to the industrial quarters, while upper
class neighborhoods are far away from industrial pollution and noise.
It would be natural to extend migration games in order to study the
co-evolutionary dynamics of population structure and urban growth. On
the long run, we hope this will contribute to a better understanding and
planning of the population dynamics in a city.
Further research work can also study conflicts related with migratory
behavior, as has been revealed by the empirical research [47,48].
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